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RECENT CASES
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE--CHILD EN VENTRE SA MERE-PRENATAL
INJURIES
Damasiewicz et. al. v. Gorsuch et. al.a was an action by infant and next friend
to recover for injuries sustained in an automobile accident, as a result of negligence
of defendants, while still in mother's womb. Defendant's demurrer was sustained
and judgment entered for defendants. On plaintiff's appeal it was held that an
infant en ventre sa mere is entitled to recovery.
The right of an infant to maintain an action for prenatal injuries, in absence
of statute, has long been denied.2 The first and perhaps the leading case in this
country, decided in 1884, with opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes, denied the right
of the infant en ventre sa mere to recover on two grounds: there was no precedent
for such an action and the infant was not a separate, existing, legal person, but
a "part" of the mother.8 The Maryland court represents the trend of recent cases
to allow the right of recovery to an infant en ventre sa mere.4 Several courts have
indicated they would recognize the right in a proper case. 5 The present case stated
four reasons for allowing the right of recovery: the confused state of the law
elsewhere, the practically unanimous criticism of the majority cases by writers on
the subject, 6 the reasons behind the cases were based on outworn points of view
1 -Md.-,
79 A.2d 550 (1951).
2 Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 108 So. 566 214 Ala. 611; Smith v. Luckhardt, 19
N.E. 2nd. 446, 229 I11. 100; Newman v. City of Detroit, 274 N.W. 710, 281 Mich. 60; Buel v.
United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, 154 S.W. 71, 72, 284 Mo. 126, 45 L.R.A., N.S., Ann Cas. 1914c 613;
In re Roberts Estates, 286 N.Y.S. 476, 158 Misc. 698; Kratz v. Cleveland, Akron Canton Bus Co.,
32 Ohio N.P., N.S. 445; Berlin v. J. C. Penny Co., 339 Pa. 547, but see 4 D&C 227; Gormain v.
Budlong, 49 A. 704, 23 R.I. 169; Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 78 S.W.2nd. 944,
124 Tex. 347, 97 A.L.R. 1513, 31 C. J. p. 1115 note 77.
$ Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14.
4 Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, D.CD.C., (1946), (malpractice suit: distinguished Dietrich
case and case before court, in which child was viable at time of injury) ; William v. Marion Rapid
Transit, 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2nd. 334, 340, 10 A.L.R. 2nd. 1051, (1949), (recognized right
of recovery of viable child without legislative action, for such right was one existing at common
law); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2nd. 838, 841, 10 A.L.R. 2nd. 634, (1949),
(malpractice suit: right of recovery of viable child, and an absence of precedent should afford
no refuge for those who by their wrongful act, if such be proved, have invaded the right of an
individual); Jasinsky v. Potts, 153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E.2nd. 809, (1950), (wrongful death
statute: interpretation of statute to be that right of recovery had always existed in the state, and
infant en ventre sa mere, could bring action under the statute).
5 Lipps v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. and Light Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W. 916, 917, L.R.A.
1917b, 334, (1916), (very cogent reasons may be urged for a contrary rule where the infant is
viable, and especially where defendant, being a doctor or midwife has negligently injured an unborn child, as to such case we express no opinion) ; Prescott v. Robinson, 74 N.H. 460, 69 A. 522,
524, 17 L.R.A.,N.S. 594, (1908), (whether it may or may not, after birth maintain an action is
immaterial to this case).
6 PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, (1941) 188-190; SALMOND, TORTS, (9th ed. 1936) 370; Winfield, The
Unborn Child, (1936) 14 TENN. L. REv. 151; Straub "Right of action for Prenatal Injuries," (1930)
33 LAw NOTEs 205, "Frey, Injuries to Infants en ventre sa mere," (1927) 12 ST. Louis L. Rzv.
85; Gaines, "Infants' Right of Action for Prenatal Injuries," (1951) Wis. L. Rnv. 518-528; Muse,
Spinella, "Right of Infant to Recover for Prenatal Injury," (1950) VA. L. REv. 36; 611-625.

RECENT CASES

and now rejected by modern science, and this was the first occasion to decide what
was the common law on this subject and the decision must be made on the basis
of present day knowledge.7 It has now been held that an infant may recover for
direct injury to a viable foetus,s for an indirect injury to a viable foetus9 and it
has been indicated that willful injury to a viable foetus will grant the infant the
right to recover."0 Viable has been defined by the New Century Dictionary as
"Capable of living, physically fitted to live; of a foetus having reached such a
stage of development as to permit continued existence under normal conditions
outside the womb." The present case by dicta suggested the no distinction should
be made between a viable and non-viable foetus:
"At some period in their growth they reach a stage where they can live
apart from their mother. But, from a medical point of view, a child is
alive within the mother before the time arrives when it can live apart
from her. If it is injured at a time when, according to Blackstone, it is
'able to stir in the mother's womb' there would seem to be just as
logical a basis for allowing it to recover, as if it were injured after it had
reached the period in its growth when it could be removed from the
mother and live. In both cases it is alive, and in both cases there has occurred an injury to a living human being for which the responsible party
should be made liable." ...It is a medical question when the infant
becomes alive and must be determined on the facts in each case."12
It appears that in Maryland at least in a proper case they will not require that a
child be viable as a condition precedent to recovery.
Richard W. Cleckner
7 Bliss v. Paesanesi, 95 N.E.2nd. 206, 207, (1950), (after denying recovery on basis of Dietrich
case, n. 1, the court stated, "we do not intimate what our decision would be if the question
were presented for the first time.").
8 Bonbrest v. Kotz, n. 4; Verkennes v. Corniea, n. 4.
9 Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, n. 4; Jasinsky v. Potts, n. 4.
10 Restatement, Torts § 869 (1939) states: "A person who negligently causes harm to an unborn
child is not liable to such child for the harm." Caveat: "The institute takes no position upon the
question whether there is liability to a child hurt while unborn by a person who intentionally
or recklessly, and without excuse, harms the mother or child."
11 n. 1, at 559.

12 n. 1, at 561.
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JOINDER OF HUSBAND

In the recent case of Smigell et a v. Brod, 79 A2d 411, Mr. Justice Stearne
said, by obiter dictum:
"It is unnecessary to cite statutes and cases that insofar as real estate is
concerned, a married woman may neither convey nor mortgage real estate
without the joinder of the husband." (Emphasis the courts)
Does this mean that the Act of May 17, 1945 P. L. 625 has no significance
concerning a married woman's capacity to mortgage her realty? The act expressly
states:
Section 1. "...hereafter a married woman shall have the same right and
power as a married man to acquire, own, possess, control, use, lease,
mortgage, sell, or otherwise dispose of any property of any kind, real,
personal or mixed.., to the same extent as a married man. (Emphasis
m statute)
If the purpose of this act was to remove the married woman's disability under
the Act of June 8, 1893 P. L. 344 preventing her from encumbering her separate
property without the joinder of her husband, then Mr. Justice Stearne's statement
seems to be a hasty generalization.
On the other hand if we attribute to this dictum its literal import, it follows
that the legislature's latest effort to increase the married woman's contractual
capacity was ineffective.
It is suggested that Mr. Justice Steame's observation is the reflection of
older members of the bar toward the traditional incapacity of a married woman to
mortgage her realty, and the better practice, until the Supreme Court decides
a case raising a question under the Act of 1945, is to require the joinder of the
husband to the wife's mortgage.
Russell F. Griest
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VENDOR AND VENDEE-DAMAGES RECOVERABLE FOR BREACH OF
WRITTEN CONTRACT TO CONVEY LAND-EXTENSION OF THE BAD
FAITH RULE.
A recent decision, In re Craven's Estate,' has added another layer to the
solid strata of case law surrounding the Pennsylvania "bad faith rule" as it was
developed in the case of Seidlek v. Bradley,2 which finally cleared up prior decisional confusion in regard to the damages recoverable for breach of parol contracts to convey land, on one hand, and for breach of similar written contracts, on
the other. Stated briefly, the rule is this: If the vendor has obtained a parol
contract by fraud, the vendee will recover his loss of bargain, in addition to interest and expenses, but the vendor's refusal to convey in the face of a parol contract
does not amount to fraud and will not entitle the vendee to loss of bargain. There
are two bases for the rule; one, that the Pennsylvania Statute of Frauds does not
cover contracts to convey,8 and the second, that fraud in the inception takes a
contract out of the statute. The qualification that mere refusal to convey does not
amount to fraud exists because enforcement of a parol contract would in effect
amount to a decree of specific performance and constitute a direct violation of
the statute. Under a written contract to convey land, however, the vendee may recover his loss of bargain, "where the vendor is guilty of collusion, tort, artifice,
fraud or does acts not in good faith to escape from a bad bargain." 4 Note the important distinction: Unjustifiable refusal to convey under a written contract is
fraud and invokes the bad faith rule, but that same refusal is not fraud in a parol
contract, where the fraud must occur in the inception. The rule points out the
protean quality of the genus fraud, and the distinction is discussed in an early
case note by Professor J. P. McKeehan. 5

Antithetically, the so-called "good faith rule" protects the vendor, in either a
parol or a written contract, where he is unable to .convey through no fault of his own.
In the instant case Craven, the deceased vendor, entered into a written contract with the Marshall Construction Company, on March 30, 1946, whereby
he agreed to sell certain enumerated lots to the company. Exactly five months
later he contracted to sell part of the same land to Thomas E. James, the present
plaintiff, and in a later contract agreed to sell the remainder to another vendee.
Shortly thereafter, the Marshall Company filed a bill for specific performance
in equity, which was granted by the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
on April 25, 1947.6 Eventually the plaintiff purchased this land (to which he
was entitled under his contract with the deceased) from the Marshall Company,
but only by paying $1,840.00 over the original contract price. In the interim the
1
2
8
4

169 Pa. Super. 94, 82 A.2d 60 (1951).
293 Pa. 379, 142 A. 914 (1928).
Act of March 21, 1772, 1 Sin. L. 389, § 1, 33 P.S. 1.
Bitner v. Brough, 11 Pa. 127 (1849).

6 33 DICK. L. REV. 87 (1928).

6 Affirmed in Marshall Construction Co., Inc. v. Forsyth, 359 Pa. 8, 57 A.2d 902 (1948).
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vendor died, and the plaintiff brought this action against his executor for recovery
of his loss of bargain.
Defendant first contended that in all the Pennsylvania cases in which the
bad faith rule has been applied there have been acts of bad faith after the contract
has been entered into, and these acts have been done with the express purpose
of evading the terms of the contract. The crux of the executor's argument is that
the vendor was to receive more consideration from the plaintiff, that for this reason
he would have been only too glad to convey to the second vendee, but that he was
deterred from this end by the unpropitious decree of specific performance
in favor of the first vendee. But, since a judicial decree which deprives a vendor
of ability to convey after he has entered a contract to that effect cannot be construed as bad faith, the vendor's estate should not be liable for loss of bargain.
In support, the defendant invokes, and the court cites with approval, section
458 of the Restatement of Contracts, which provides that; "A contractual duty or a
duty to make compensation is discharged, in the absence of circumstances showing
either a contrary intention or contributing fault on the part of the person to the
duty, where performance is subsequently prevented or prohibited (a) [by statute]
or (b) by a judicial, executive or administrative order made with due authority by
a judge or other officer of the United States, or any one of the United States."
But the court holds that the vendor comes within the "contributing fault"
exception to the Restatement rule because he had conveyed equitable title in his
contract with the Marsall Company, the first vendee, and, when he contracted
with the plaintiff, the vendor " . . . was seized of bare legal title in and to the

premises. This certainly constitutes contributing fault; and, moreover, we are of
the opinion that it constitutes legal bad faith." The court bases this contention on
its holding that knowledge of lack of equitable title at the time of contracting is,
"in the same category as if he had no title at all." As for the good faith rule, the
court holds that deceased was deemed to know of the existence of the first contract when he entered the second, and the good faith rule "seems generally to be
regarded as being inapplicable to cases where the vendor knew of a defect in title
when he entered into the contract."1
Two elements, then, comprise this extension of the bad faith rule. First,
knowledge by the vendor that he is obligated to convey the land under an existing
contract, and secondly, a decree of specific performance which converts the first
contract into a conveyance and deprives the vendor of title. Although this is
not an act by the vendor designed to escape the obligation of the second contract,
it nevertheless brings him within the scope of the bad faith rule and makes him
liable to the second vendee for loss of bargain, regardless of the general rule
that an obligation to perform a contract is discharged by judicial decree which prevents or prohibits performance.
Frederic K. Spies
7t 55 AM. JUR. 956, Vendor and Purchaser, § 553.
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PAROL EVIDENCE RULE - CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO A
CONTRACT
In a recent case, McMinm v. Mammone,1 the Pennsylvania Superior Court
added more confusion to our Parol Evidence Rule and its application. The facts
of the case are briefly as follows: A written agreement was prepared whereby
McMinn was to furnish and install various equipment in a building owned by
Mammone. The agreement was signed by McMinn and under the notation accepted - July 9, 1949 (Emphasis supplied) Mammone signed his name. At the
trial Mammone attempte Ito introduce parol evidence to show that he and McMinn
had made a contemporaneous oral agreement that the paper was not intended to
constitute a contract until the happening of a future event, to-wit: the further
perusal of the offer by Mammone with his son and the final approval of it by
him within a reasonable time thereafter. The trial court refused to admit the
parol evidence and upon appeal the Pennsylvania Superior Court likewise refused
admission of the parol evidence upon the theory that this violated our Parol
2
Evidence Rule as laid down in Gianni v. R. Russell and Co. Inc.
"All preliminary negotiations, conversations and verbal agreements, are
merged in and superseded by the subsequent written contract and unless
fraud, accident, or mistake be averred the writing constitutes the agreements between the parties and its terms cannot be added to nor substracted from by parol evidence."
The court in the McMinn case appears to be confused in its application of
the Parol Evidence Rule since generally the Parol Evidence Rule does not become
applicable until a contract between the parties is definitely established. 8 It may
be shown by parol evidence that the parties agreed orally that the writing should
not become effective until some future day, if this is not inconsistent with the
express terms of the writing. Actually Mammone is not attempting to alter or
contradict the terms of a written contract but he is attempting to show there
n1ever was a contract. Two distinct problems are involved: (1) Is there a legally
operative written instrument? (2) Given a legally operative written instrument,
can parol evidence be introduced to change its legal effect? Often the courts
fail to distinguish between these two problems and talk in terms of the Parol
Evidence Rule when in fact they are trying to determine whether there is an
instrument upon which the rule should operate. The Rule has no application
until it has been decided that a legally operative written instrument exists, and
when this question has been answered in the affirmative, then, and only then,
does the Rule have to be considered.
Possibly Pennsylvania does not allow conditions precedent to be shown when
there is a written contract. If this is true then Pennsylvania decisions are incon1 169 Pa. Super. 1, 82 A.2d 70 (1951).
2 281 Pa. 320, 126 A. 791 (1924).
8 3 WILLISTON AND THOMPSON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS
WIGMORE ON EVIDENcE 2410 (1940 3rd Ed.).

634 (1936 Ed.); 9

WIGMORB,
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sistent with the reasoning of the Parol Evidence Rule, because, as pointed out in
the previous paragraph, the Rule does not apply until there is a contract. Also,
the majority of the states allow conditions precedent to be shown, and the Restatement of Contracts is the model upon which the majority relies. § 241 provides:
"Where parties to a writing which purports to be an integration of a
contract between them, orally agree, befor or contemporaneously with
the making of the writing, that it shall not become binding until a future
day or until the happening of a future event, the oral agreement is operative if there is nothing in the writing inconsistent therewith."
In Smilow v. Dickerson,4 Justice Stearne, in writing the opinion for the
majority, held a condition precedent does not violate the Parol Evidence Rule, saying:
"Had the paper been unconditionally executed and delivered and intended to be a true contract between the parties, then, under Gianni v. R.
Russell and Co. Inc. and the numerous cases following it, defendant could
not be heard to contradict or alter its written terms but the paper was not
unconditionally executed and delivered."
Justice Stearne goes on to review the English cases and other jurisdictions
on this question and reaches the conclusion that Pennsylvania is in accord with
the majority. Furthermore, Eaton v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. of N. Y.6 recognized
the admissibility of parol evidence to show a condition precedent but the present
case disposed of both the Smilow and Eaton cases by saying "these cases were
decided on the basis of their own peculiar facts." The Superior Court in the
McMinn case does not expressly overrule the cases which recognize conditions
precedent but the decision seems to foster that result, because the facts involved
a condition precedent very similar to the present case. The court contents itself
by distinguishing the Eaton and Smilow cases on the basis of their "peculiar"
facts but it does not point out why the reasoning of the Smilow case should not
be applied. Here the McMinn case appears to be particularly unjustifiable because
the defendant is attempting to show the paper was conditionally executed and
delivered. In addition, this court cited Grubb v. Rockey6 and the Gianni case as
being in accord with its decision but in neither of these cases did the problem of
showing a condition precedent arise. In the Grubb case the defendant was attempting to show by parol an agreement that the sales price was a specified sum,
in excess of the amount stated in the written agreement. Certainly the defendant
was attempting to vary the terms of the written instrument since he does not
deny that there was a contract, but that he was induced to enter into the agreement in reliance on the oral agreement that the sales price was to be different
from the amount stated in the contract. Pennsylvania has flatly held that a
4 357 Pa. 455, 54 A.2d 883 (1947).
5 315 Pa. 68, 172 A. 121 (1934).
6 366 Pa. 592, 79 A.2d'255 (1951).
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breach of faith in failing to carry out a parol contemporaneous agreement is
not fraud as that phrase is used in the term "fraud, accident or mistake." 7 In the
Gianni case the defendant was attempting to show a parol agreement which induced him to enter the contract. Justice Stearne in a case decided two years after
the Smilow case recognized this distinction and applied the Parol Evidence Rule
where the defendant did not allege a conditional delivery but was attempting
to show an implied condition within the contract.8
Since Pennsylvania has recognized conditions precedent, it is possible that
this case excluded parol evidence on the basis of an exception given in the last
if there is nothing
line of § 241 in the Restatement of Contracts, supra, "....
in the writing inconsistent therewith." Parol evidence is inadmissible to show
a condition precedent when it would be inconsistent with the writing. In the
present case it may be inconsistent since Mammone signed under the notation
"accepted-July 9, 1949" and now he is attempting to show by parol that he
did not accept on that date. The interpretation as to when the writing is inconsistent
with the parol agreement has resulted in confusion and uncertainty. In a Mississippi
case 9 a written agreement provided "this constitutes the complete agreement between the parties hereto and cannot be changed in any manner whatsoever without the written consent of both buyer and seller" and this court held the oral
agreement, providing it should not become operative until approved by a third
party, was not inconsistent with the writing. In an Illinois case' 0 the court said
the oral 'evidence to show that a guaranty contract was not to be effective until
executed by additional parties was inconsistent with the writing since the instrument did have some of, but not all, the other parties' signature. The New York
court, in Fadex Foreign Trading Corp. v. Crown Steel Corp.," expressed its
dislike for the Restatement's exception and allowed parol evidence to show that
a sales agreement was not to become effective until the happening of an event
even though the written agreement provided, for delivery "at once." The New
York court in discussing the exception under the Restatement said:
"Such an exception to the general rule would make it practically impossible to have a conditional delivery of a contract of the sales of goods
because it is very rare that there is no provision for a time of delivery
in such agreements. Furthermore it is lacking in business utility. Business men should not be expected to know that the giving of such
a normal specification as a delivery date in a sales contract ipso facto
destroys the effect of a proposed conditional delivery of the contract."

7 Bank of Hooverville v. Sagerson, 283 Pa. 406, 129 A. 333 (1925); Fidelity Title and Trust
Co. Trustee v. Garland, 291 Pa. 297, 139 A. 876 (1927).

8
9
10
11

Walker v. Saricks, 360 Pa. 594, 63 A.2d 9 (1949).
Plant Flour Mills Co. v. Sanders and Ellis, 172 Miss. 539, 157 So. 713 (1934).
Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Cohen, 248 I1. App. 181, 1 N.E.2d 717 (1936).
69 N.Y.S.2d 128, 186 Misc. 611 (1947).

256
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In summation, what theories can be applied to the decision in the McMinn
case? There are two possible interpretations: (1) The court is indirectly overruling the prior cases recognizing that a condition precedent can be shown by parol
evidence, and, if this is true, then Pennsylvania has become very strict in its
application of the Parol Evidence Rule by going beyond the reason for the
Rule itself. (2) The court is recognizing the Restatement exception and will exclude parol evidence where the writing is inconsistent with the oral agreement.
However, the court does not cite the Restatement in its opinion. If the exception
is recognized, the showing of a condition precedent is almost nullified, for in
all agreements of this nature there will be a signature and even if the notation
"accepted-July 9, 1949" had been omitted the purported contract would appear
to be inconsistent with any oral agreement that the writing was not to become
a contract until the happening of some condition precedent.
What attitude the Pennsylvania courts will take in deciding future cases
involving conditions precedent remains an open question.
Donald E. Albright
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JURISDICTION-DOING BUSINESS-DUE PROCESS
In a recent case, Symth v. Twin State Improvement Corp.' the Supreme Court
of Vermont upheld the constitutionality of a statute giving jurisdiction over
foreign corporations that mike a contract to be performed in whole or part in
Vermont with a resident or commit a tort in whole or part in Vermont against
a resident. The statute reads as follows:
"Doing business, definition, serivice of process. If a foreign corporation makes a contract with a resident of Vermont to be performed
in whole or in part by either party in Vermont, or if such foreign corporation commits a tort in whole or in part in Vermont against a resident
of Vermont, such acts shall be deemed to be doing business in Vermont
by such foreign corporation and shall be deemed equivalent to the app ointment by such foreign corporation of the secretary of the State of
Vermont and his successors to be its true and lawful attorney upon
whom may be served all lawful process in any action or proceeding against
such foreign corporation arising from or growing out of such contract
or tort... '2

The plaintiff, a resident of Vermont brought this action to recover damages resulting from the negligence of the defendant, a foreign corporation incorporated
in Massachusetts. While replacing the roof and metal edgings on the plaintiff's
house, the plaintiff claimed the defendant was negligent. It did not appear
whether the plaintiff was acting in performance of a contract. However, the
court said that, as to the validity of the action for tort, no contract need by present
for even a volunteer has a duty of conduct which if breached will support a cause
of action. The more important question raised was the constitutionality of the
statute giving the court jurisdiction. The defendant claimed the statute violated
the due process clause of the 14th amendment. The court after discussing the
International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington case held the statute was constitutional, that the commission of a single fort in whole within the state is a
valid basis for jurisdiction.
This is an outstanding decision. It illustrates another step forward in the
trend toward increasing the jurisdiction of the forum's courts over non-resident
defendants, incorporated and unincorporated, doing business within the forum,
which if upheld and followed would have great signifigance. Heretofore it was
thought that a single act would not be a sufficient basis for jurisdiction over nonresidents where the act was not dangerous in character. Of course it remains with
the Supreme Court of the United States to decide whether due process has been
satisfied in any given case; however there have been signifigant decisions in recent
years and it is the purpose of this note to point out the developments in the ex1 Symth v. Twin State Improvement Corp. Vt. -,
80 A.2d 664 (1951).
2 V.S. 1947 § 1562 (Vermont).
S International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington 326 U. S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945).
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tension of the basis of jurisdiction over foreign corporations and non-resident
defendants doing business within a state.
There are certain fundamental principles of jurisdiction that will have to
be controlling regardless of any basis asserted. In the famous case of Pennoyer v.
Neff 4 the court laid down the principle that in order to render a binding personal
judgment, the court must have jurisdiction of the defendant or else such judgment
is void. Also the case held that such jurisdiction couldn't be acquired by
mere ownership of property within the state or service upon him outside the state
or by publication. In St. Clair v. Cox 5 the court held that the doctrine of Pennoyer
v. Neff6 "applies in all its force, to personal judgments of state courts, against
foreign corporations." How have these principles been applied by the courts?
First, for the purpose of clarity and definiteness, it should be made clear that the
term jurisdiction as used in this note applies only to the power of a court to render
a judgment or decree which will be recognized by other states and abroad as binding, and not whether a state has authorized a particular court to act or whether
the method of acquiring jurisdiction has satisfied the requirements of due process.
We are concerned here only with on what basis jurisdiction can be conferred subject to the limitations of the Constitution, rather than venue or service of process.
As to foreign corporations, at common law a foreign corporation could be
sued only in the state of its incorporation. It was considered as a legal entity and
could not migrate from the state which created it. 7 It was this entity theory
of corporations which gave rise to a number of theories to sustain the jurisdiction
of the courts of states other than the state of incorporation. With the increase
of the number and size of corporations doing business outside the state of its
incorporation with the corresponding increase in liability-creating activity, necessity impelled a basis for submission to the jurisdiction of the courts other than
the incorporating state. Doing business was held to be a valid basis of jurisdiction.8
Difficulty however is encountered in finding a legal theory on which to anchor
this basis of jurisdiction. Where the foreign corporation actually consents to the
forum's jurisdiction there is no problem. Usually all that is involved is a construction of the extent of the agent's authority to receive process. But where there
was no actual consent, the courts adopted the implied consent theory. It is stated
thus in St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. Alexander:9
"In a general way it may be said that the business must be such in
character and extent as to warrant the inference that the corporation has
subjected itself to the jurisdiction and laws of the district in which
it is served and in which it is bound to appear when a proper agent
has been served with process."
4 Pennoyer v. Neff 95 U. S. 350, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1878).
6 St. Clair v. Cox 106 U. S. 350, 1 S. Ct. 354, 27 L. Ed. 222 (1882).
6 n. 4.
7 Bank of Augusta v. Earle 13 Pet. 519, 10 L. Ed. 274 (1839).
8 Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French 18 How. 404, 15 L. Ed. 451 (1856)
9 St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. Alexander 227 U. S. 218, 33 S. Ct. 245 (1913).
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The implied consent theory is not broad enough to include all the cases in which
it has been held that jurisdiction did attach. See for example InternationalHarvester
v. Kentucky' ° where the agent's authority to receive process had been revoked
and no consent could be found, and the court held jurisdiction attached on the
reasoning of the presence theory announced in the following words:
"We are satisfied that the presence of a corporation within a
state necessary to the service of process is shown when it appears that
the corporation is there carrying on business in such a sense as to manifest its presence within the state..."
Likewise, the presence theory has its shortcomings when applied to the decided
cases. Jurisdiction has been held to attach after the corporation has withdrawn
from the state and is no longer "present" on causes of action arising within the
state before withdrawal." Also, in the case of the individual who is present
within the state, he may be sued on causes of action no matter where they
arose, but there is some authority that a corporation may be sued only on causes
12
of action arising within the state and out of business done with the state.
In either case, however, we still have the problem of what acts or act is
sufficient to constitute doing business so that we can say the corporation is present
for or impliedly consents to the jurisdiction of the court. Doing business is a
general term and may be significant for a number of reasons,-taxation by the
state, qualification required under statutes to do business within the state,
venue, submission to jurisdiction. It becomes important to keep in mind the purpose for which doing business is to be established. A different degree is required
depending upon the purpose. 1 " This may be a reason why the cases seem to be
inconsistent. The courts have not given sufficient consideration to the applicable
statute which necessitates the construing of the term "doing business." For our
purposes, we are only concerned with those cases dealing with jurisdiction. The
cases construing "doing business" generally state the rule to be that the acts
done must constitute some substantial part of the ordinary business of the corporation and must be continuous and systematic. An occasional or isolated act is not
sufficient. 4 Mere solicitation is not enough.' 5 The emphasis seems to be on
the quantum of business carried on.
These cases are superceded by the case of InternationalShoe v. State of Washington' 6 which indicates a transition in this field of the law. The court there discarded the presence and consent theories. As to the consent theory it said:
10
11
12
18

International Harvester v. Kentucky 234 U. S. 579, 34 S. Ct. 944, 58 L. Ed. 1479 (1914).
Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Phelps 190 U. S. 147, 23 S. Ct. 707, 47 L. Ed. 987 (1907).
Old Wayne Mutual Life Ass'n v. McDonough 204 U. S. 8, 27 S. Ct. 236, 51 L. Ed. 345 (1907).
Isaacs: An Analysis of Doing Business 25 COL. LAW REV. 1018, 1024 (1925).

14 Rosenberg Co. v. Curtis Brown Co. 260 U. S. 516, 43 S. Ct. 170, 67 L. Ed. 372 (1923); New

v.
45
15
16

Robinson-Houchin Optical Co. 357 Pa. 47, 53 A.2d 79 (1947), Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert
F.2d 139 (1930).
Green v. Chicago, B. & Q., Ry. Co. 205 U. S. 530, 27 S. Ct. 595, 51 L. Ed. 916 (1907).
n. 3.
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"Some of the decisions holding the corporation amenable to suit
have been supported by resort to the legal fiction that it has given its
consent to service and suit, consent being implied from its presence
in the state through acts of its authorized agents. . . But more realistically
it may be said that those authorized acts were of such a nature to justify
the fiction."
As to the presence theory the court said:
"To say that the corporation is so far 'present' there to satisfy due
process requirements, for the purpose of taxation or the maintenance
of suits against it in the courts of the state, is to beg the question to be
decided. For the terms 'present' or 'presence' are used merely to symbolize those activities of the corporation's agent within the state which
courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process."
The court then lays down the principle that a corporation have such contacts
"with the state of the forum as to make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit
which is brought there." As to what acts will be sufficient contacts with the forum,
the test announced is one of quality and nature rather than quantity of corporate
activities. The court said:
"It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line between those activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to
suit, and those which do not, cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative . .. Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the
quality and nature of the acfivity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process
clause to insure."
In other words, the court replaces the implied consent and presence theories
with one of reasonableness: Does the corporation have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum to make it reasonable to subject it to the jurisdiction of the
forum in view of the quality and nature of the corporate activity. "An estimate
of the inconveniences which would result to the corporation in a trial away from
its home is relevant in the connection." This is apparently what the courts were
doing when attempting to apply the implied consent and presence theories. The
International Shoe 1" case, at least approaches the problem realistically even
though the test appears to have less certainty in application to any one set of
facts than did the implied consent and presence theories where the quantity of
corporate activity was the controlling factor. The answer now seems to depend
on the nature of the activity in relationship to the purpose for which jurisdiction
is sought.1 8
A logical extension of the "minimum contact" doctrine would seem to apply
to single and occasional acts. The court says:
17

id.

18 id.
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"Although the commission of some single or occasional acts of
the corporate agent in a state sufficient to impose an obligation or liability
on the corporation has not thought to confer upon the state authority
to enforce it . . . Other such acts, because of their nature and quality
and the circumstances of their commission may be deemed sufficient to
render the corporation liable to suit." 19
In fact, the doctrine seems to merge the doing business and doing an act concept into a concept of reasonableness. In the InternationalShoe case20 it was held
that continuous and systematic solicitation of offers by the corporation's resident
agents subjected it to a tax for Workmen's Compensation and to suit to recover
that tax. In Traveler's Health Ass'n v. Virginia2 l the corporation was held to be
amenable to suit within the forum where its activities amounted to mere solicitation of orders by mail for insurance. Justice Black writing the opinion in this case
cited the International Shoe case with approval although he dissented in the
International Shoe decision. There has been no United States Supreme Court
case upholding the constitutionality of a statute imposing amendability of suit
upon a corporation committing a single or occasional acts. It seems to be an open
question. But it is submitted that in view of the doctrine announced in the Inter22
nationalShoe case, the court in the Symth v. Twin State Improvement Corp. case
properly upheld the constitutionality of the statute attacked. The witnesses are
In Vermont. The defendant, a corporation incorporated in Massachusetts, is relatively near to the forum. The case involved a tort. And in view of the development of
the law concerning jurisdiction over non-resident individuals doing an act, it would
seem that the commission of a tort should afford sufficient basis for jurisdiction.
The resident is in need of a remedy whether the corporation has committed one act
or many.
In the case of non-resident individuals, we have the rule laid down in
Flexner v. Farson2 s that doing business by a non-resident is not a basis for jurisdiction. The validity of this basis of jurisdiction as against foreign corporations
springs from the power to exclude such corporation, and therefore the power to
impose amenability to suit as a condition of admission. 2 4 This reasoning is unsound. A state may not exclude a corporation engaged in interstate commerce, but
yet it may subject it to the jurisdiction of the state.25 Likewise, a state may not
exclude a non-resident motorist, but yet it may subject him to service of process. 26
Also in Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman2 7 the jurisdiction of the forum was
upheld where the non-resident was engaged in the selling of securities by an agent.
What then is the theory on which the court relies? In these cases the court stresses
19 id.

21 Traveler's Health Ass'n v. Virginia 339 U. S. 643, 94 L. Ed. 1157 (1950)
22n.. 1.

28 Flexner v. Farson 248 U.
24 Virginia v. Paul 8 Wall.
25 n. 10.
26 Hess v. Pawloski 274 U.
27 Henry L. Doherty & Co.

70 S. Ct. 927.

S. 289, 39 S. Ct. 97, 63 L. Ed. 250 (1919).
L68, 19 L. Ed. 357 (1868).

S. 322, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 109 (1927).
v. Goodman 294 U. S. 623, 55 S. Ct. 553, 79 L. Ed. 1097 (1935).
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the dangerous character of the defendants' acts. In Hess v. Pawloski28 the court
emphasizes the physical dangerousness of the motor vehicle, and in Henry L.
Doherty & Co. v. Goodman29 the economic danger of the defendants' acts. 80 The
court in the InternationalShoe said:
"But now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to
personal service of summons or other forms of notice, due process
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
ersonam, if he b%not present within the territory of the forum, he
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' "
What the court said as to individuals would be dictum, but it did start the opinion
with the analogy. Applying the minimum contact test, it would appear that the
acts nveed not be inherently dangerous and doing business could be a valid basis
for jurisdiction over individuals. It is believed that in view of the dictum in the
International Shoe case and the Doherty case the court has recognized the power
of the state to control the activities of non-citizens, whether incorporated or unincorporated, provided that it make no unreasonable discrimination against noncitizens in favor of citizens. And this is not based upon any exclusion or conditional admission principle as laid down in Virginia v. Paul,81 for this principle has
been considerably undermined by limitations imposed by the United States Supreme
Court, as has the decision of Flexner v. Farson,82 but on a reasonable exercise of
police power.38
Carroll A. Lingg
2S n. 26.
29 n. 27.
80 The court

did not expressly stress the damgerous character of the defendants' acts, but by implication, in saying that Iowa treats the business of dealing in corporate securities as exceptional,
and subject to special regulation.
31 n. 24.
82 n. 23.
88 STEVENS,

CORPORATIONS
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AGENCY-RATIFICATION-PURPORTING TO ACT AS AGENT
It is a well known rule of agency in order that the doctrine of ratification can
apply in a principal-agent-third party relationship, the agent who acts outside his
authority and makes a contract with the third person must have purported to act
as agent. Then and only then will a subsequent affirmance by the principal be
held ratification. (All other elements present of course.)' The act done must have
been on behalf of the principal. If it .was done by the agent on his own behalf, or on
the account of some third person, the act cannot thus be ratified.2 The need for
such a rule usually arises where an agent fails to make it clear to the third person that
he is acting for another, or that he fraudulently sells the goods of another as
his own. In these cases the courts indicate the third person never intended to contract with the principal hence subsequent affirmance by the principal does not
make him a party to the contract.3 Practically all jurisdictions, 4 text writers, 5 and
7
the Restatement of Agency6 are in accord with this rule.
The question now arises: If the third party with whom the agent deals has
knowledge of lack of authority in the agent, does this knowledge automatically
mean the agent can no longer purport to act as agent and thus come within the
meaning of the general rule stated above, so as to preclude subsequent ratification
by the principal?
Just such a question arose in the recent Delaware case of Hirzel Funeral
Homes Inc. v. Equitable Trust Co.8 Here the plaintiff sued the defendant as
executor under the last will and testament of John E. Kreggenwinkel, deceased,
to recover expenses of burial of decedent's son. Immediately after the death of the
son, the divorced mother and others went to the plaintiff's funeral home and
made burial arrangements, charging the expense to the father, indicating he would
pay. Although they stated the father had not expressly authorized their act, they
said he would later ratify it. An affirmance of.this act was made by the father in the
form of a power of attorney given to his lawyer authorizing the payment of the
bill. Before this was done, however, the father died. His executor refused to
honor the bill, and as a result, the plaintiff instituted this suit claiming ratification of the contract.
The court held that the deceased son's mother and others had not represented
themselves as agents of the father with present authority to negotiate the con1 Restatement, Agency § 85 (1933).
2 MEECHEM, on Agency § 386, 280-281; Vol. 1.
8 Restatement, Agency § 85; See illustrations under comment for section 1.
4 2 C.J.S. 1078; § 41.
r MEECHEM n. 2; SEAVEY, STUDIES IN AGENCY, 103; also TIFFANY ON AGENCY, § 48, 135.
6 n. 1.
7 But Massachusetts holds to a minority rule which allows ratification where the third person does
not know the agent with whom he deals is in fact an agent. Hayward v. Langmaid, 63 N.E. 912,
181 Mass. 426 (1902).
8 83 A. 700 (1951).
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tract for burial at the father's expense and hence the purported ratification by the
father was not binding on the estate.
The court relied on the general rule above as the basis of their decision.
They concluded from the evidence that the divorced mother and others did not
purport to act as agents, in spite of the fact that the plaintiff was told the father
would pay: that the plaintiff was told the father would later ratify the contract; and
that the natural result in such a situation is for a father to see to it that his son had a
proper burial. The court seemed to intimate that because the plaintiff knew that
the actors had no present authority, it was impossible for them to purport to act
as agents. Hence, once a third person knows of lack of authority in the agent,
there can bLe no ratification because there can be no purporting to act as agent and
the general rule would apply.
The Restatement of Agency seems to take a different view, however. Section
85 states thL general rule above. But in the comment, it indicates that the mere
fact the third person has knowledge of lack of authority in the agent, does not
automatically result in failure to purport to act as agent and thus bring the general
rule into effect.
"Purporting to act on account of another does not necessarily mean
that the agent represents to the third person that the principal has authorized him to act on his account in the transaction. A person purports to
act on account of another if he undertakes to act on his behalf-and to
make the other a party to the transaction, although the person acting
may also manifest to the third person that he does not know whether
or not hL is authorized, or even that he is not authorized."9
This recognizes the fact that a man could still hold himself out as acting
for another and for another's benefit, even though he admits he is not authorized
at present. Had this view been taken by the court in the instant case, a different
result might have been reached. For here, even though the plaintiff knew of the
lack of authority, the divorced mother and others indicated they were acting on behalf of the father, and if in fact they were, then, the court would have said they
were purporting to act as agent and the general rule that ratification will not apply where the agent does not purport to act as agent could not have been used.
There are no cases that the writer can find to support the Restatement comment.
Nor is there a surplus of authority of the view taken by the court in the principal
case. The lack of cases in the court's reasoning seems to indicate that this was
practically a problem of first impression. One case does seem to strengthen the
principle case, however. Allen et al. v. Greenland Oil Co. et al.10 involved a contract made with a third person by an agent. The third person knew the agent
had no authority to make this type of contract. The court refused attempted
9 Restatement, Agency § 85, comment c. (1933).
10 256 P. 1004, 124 Kan 1 (1927).
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ratification by the principal stating that one of the essentials of ratification is
that "the party contracting with the agent did not know the agent lacked authority
to make the agreement." Hence, knowledge in the third person would automatically
preclude ratification.
It is not the purpose of the writer to do more than point out the two conflicting views of the meaning of the general rule. But it is interesting to note that
the liberal interpretation by the Restatement indicates a party might in fact be
acting on behalf of another, that is, purport to be agent in spite of the fact he has
indicated to the third party with whom he deals that he has no present authority.
Here then the subjective intent of the agent is recognized. The third party may
intend to make a present contract subject to ratification. The general rule should
be satisfied because the third party at once knows with whom he hopes to be
bound, that is, the principal.
Yet on the other hand, to follow the view of the instant case, that the third
party with knowledge of the agent's lack of authority precludes the agent acting
or purporting to act as agent, seems more consistent with the basic theory behind
ratification. As Professor Seavey points out, ratification is a legal fiction.'" Its
purpose is to satisfy the reasonable expectations of persons, at least so far as they
have expressed them. Where T deals with A, believing A to act on authority
from P when in fact he is not, T expects that his contract with P will be valid. And
if P does an act of ratification, the ratification binds P and T. T's expectation is
fulfilled. But where T deals with A and knows A has no authority to contract
for P, how can T expect that he made a binding contract with P? Hence there
can be no ratification, indeed, there is no need for it. Without it, T gets no more
than he expected.
Thus we have the two possibilities arising out of the general rule requiring
an agent to purport to act as agent before there can be a valid ratification by the
principal. If the third person had knowledge of lack of authority, under one, there
can be no ratification, while under the other, there can be. Hence, it is apparent
the general rule needs closer definition. Although the ordinary case can be disposed
of easily, when circumstances such as in the instant case arise, confusion as to the
true rule results.
Robert G. Rose
11
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